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The following paper identifies two different urban policy regimes in Latin America—
neoliberal and socialist—and traces their origins to the distinct interests and capacities of 
local elites and activists in the region’s cities in the mid-to-late twentieth century.  While 
agricultural and commercial interests paid a high price for the growth of import-
substituting industrialization, and therefore deployed free trade zones (and similar 
institutions) in traditional export centers in the 1960s and 1970s, their industrial rivals 
bore the brunt of austerity and adjustment in the free market era, and therefore adopted 
compensatory measures designed to increase the “social wage” in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Examples are drawn from municipalities in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela and call the conventional portrait of impotent Latin American 






A substantial and growing body of literature identifies and accounts for the 
emergence of distinct types of urban political economy in the late twentieth century 
world system.  For instance, Peter Evans (2002) and his colleagues extol the virtues of 
“livable cities.”  Saskia Sassen (1991) discusses the contradictions of “global cities.”  
Don Pinnock (1989) labels Cape Town a “garrison city.”  And Richard Florida (2002; see 
also Scott 2006) has made a veritable industry out of the so-called creative city.1  The 
inventory of names and labels threatens to outgrow the population of cities in need of 
classification, however, and taxonomic caution is therefore in order.  After all, New York 
has simultaneously been classified as “global,” “post-Fordist,” “creative,” and “divided” 
(Sassen 1991; Mayer 1991; Florida 2002; Fainstein 1992), and Los Angeles appears to 
earn a new adjective or sobriquet almost every other year (Soja 1995; Low 1997). 
The following paper therefore tempts fate by labeling and analyzing the 
dialectical evolution of two different types of urban political economy—neoliberal and 
socialist—in late twentieth century and early twenty first century Latin America.  Part 1 
identifies the ideological differences between the two types of city as well as their 
implications for public policy.  While neoliberal cities prioritize accumulation, and 
therefore use tax breaks, regulatory rollbacks, and the repression of organized labor to 
attract and retain foreign direct investment, their socialist rivals prioritize distribution, 
and therefore use social funds, microcredit arrangements, and participatory institutions to 
employ and empower their citizens.  Part 2 treats the emergence of municipal 
                                                 
1 We could go on.  Tim Hall and Phil Hubbard (1996; Harris 1997) weigh the costs and benefits of 
“entrepreneurial cities.”   Gordon MacLeod (2002) expects entrepreneurial cities to be transformed into 
“revanchist cities.” Susan Christopherson (1994) identifies and illuminates “fortress cities.”  And a host of 
scholars have discussed the “post-Fordist city” (see, e.g., Mayer 1994). 
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neoliberalism as a secondary city or hinterland reaction to the growth of urban primacy or 
bias in the middle of the twentieth century.  While industrial interests in traditional 
population centers like Mexico City and São Paulo reaped the rewards of import-
substituting industrialization (ISI), and therefore organized to defend their gains, their 
agricultural and commercial rivals paid a high price for tariffs and foreign exchange 
controls, and therefore offset or compensated for the growth of urban bias by deploying 
free trade zones (and similar institutions) in secondary cities like Juárez and Manaus.  
Part 3 traces the origins of municipal socialism to the breakdown of ISI and the arrival of 
the debt crisis and national neoliberal policies in the late twentieth century.  While 
municipal neoliberals had already embraced foreign trade and investment, and therefore 
welcomed structural adjustment at the national level, their socialist rivals feared 
globalization, and responded with a variety of compensatory measures designed to 
increase the “social wage,” not only in Mexico City and São Paulo but in other major 
cities like Lima, Montevideo, and Caracas.  And, finally, Part 4 concludes by offering a 
Polanyian interpretation of the seemingly odd convergence of neoliberal and socialist 
policy tendencies in some municipalities today—suggesting that, whatever their 
ideological preferences, municipal authorities must balance accumulation and distribution 
if they are to survive and prosper in a globalized world.  If not, both national and local 
authorities will continue to engage in the bitter struggles over policy responses to 
globalization currently under way in Venezuela and Bolivia. 
Intellectual context 
Our paper departs from a puzzling feature of the literature on Latin American 
cities.  While municipal authorities have traditionally been deprived of political and 
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economic resources, and have thereby garnered a reputation for impotence or even 
indolence, they have at times encouraged or exploited experiments in social and 
economic policymaking, and have thereby anticipated—rather than reacted to—national 
policy imperatives.  Take, for example, the case of free market economic policies.  
Municipal authorities established or encouraged the growth of free trade zones (FTZs) in 
Mexico, Central America, and the Dominican Republic in the 1960s and 1970s—a full 
decade before the debt crisis put paid to ISI at the national level (World Bank 1992, 
Table A3).   
Nor are FTZs isolated examples of municipal neoliberalism.  Brazilian and 
Argentine municipalities have been competing for foreign transplants for well over a 
quarter of a century (Business Week 1979; Schumacher 1983; Lee 1989; Wheatley 1997).  
Andean city managers have called for the decentralization of economic decision making 
authority more broadly (Catanese 1973; Economist 1987, 2001; Forero 2004; Markey 
2005; Eaton 2007).  And municipal and provincial policymakers have appeased or 
attracted business by adopting de facto, if not necessarily de jure, regulatory rollbacks 
throughout the region (see, e.g., Tendler 2002 on Brazil; and Piore 2005 on Mexico).    
As the twentieth century progressed, however, other Latin American cities 
eschewed investment incentives in favor of distributive politics, and the region therefore 
increasingly played host to “socialist” as well as recognizably neoliberal cities.  
Participatory budgeting initiatives have proliferated from southern Brazil to the rest of the 
region (Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Braütigam, 2004; Goldfrank 2006).  Recently 
decentralized public services like health care and education have been fortified, in at least 
some cases, at the local level (Ocampo and Martín 2003, Ch. IX).  And municipally 
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administered social funds have allegedly compensated the poor for the high cost of free 
market reform throughout the region (Siri 2000; Tendler and Serrano 1999; Tendler 
2000; Menocal 2004). 
Efforts to compensate and empower slum dwellers reached their apogee in the late 
1990s, however, and arguably catapulted their social democratic champions to power in 
subsequent national elections.  With this rise of the left at the national level and the 
corresponding decline of neoliberal hegemony, Latin American cities stand poised for a 
new wave of conservative counterreaction (see, e.g., Weitzman [2006] on Bolivia). 
We therefore begin to distinguish municipal socialism from municipal 
neoliberalism by highlighting three important—if by no means universal—shortcomings 
in the existing social scientific literature.  First, the existing literature tends to treat local 
experiments in social and economic policy as symptoms of—rather than precursors of—
national initiatives.  For example, Alejandro Portes and Brian Roberts trace the growth of 
export platforms like Tijuana, Iquique, and Salvador to “the abrupt end of the 
autonomous industrialization project promoted by ISI in the early 1980s” (Portes and 
Roberts 2005, p. 45 as well as pp. 53-55).  Judith Tendler holds that social funds are 
administered not by municipal authorities per se but by central government bureaucrats 
who “work through local governments” when they are “headed by the party faithful” and 
bypass local governments when they are not (Tendler 2000, p. 116).  And Rosemary 
Thorp notes that the impulse for decentralization “has always come from the centre—in 
that sense it is always top down” (Thorp quoted in Menocal 2004, p. 727). 
Second, the existing literature tends to treat subnational social and economic 
policies in isolation from one another (see Heller 1995 for an important exception to the 
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rule based on Asian materials).  Students of municipal neoliberalism rarely engage, let 
alone study, the question of social policy and students of municipal socialism rarely 
entertain, let alone study, the question of accumulation.  Nowhere is the dialogue of the 
deaf—to which we have admittedly been party—more apparent than in the expansive and 
all but entirely distinct literatures on “subnational industrial policy” (Montero 2001) and 
“participatory budgeting” in Brazil.   
And, finally, the existing literature is all but silent on the conditions for 
subnational success and failure.  While many analysts examine only successful examples 
of local experiments, and thereby render themselves vulnerable to charges of selection 
bias (see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), others treat local experiments as policy 
outcomes to be explained, and thereby sidestep the question of their subsequent success 
and failure.   
We call each of the aforementioned practices into question by noting that 
subnational social and economic policy initiatives: (1) often anticipate, rather than 
respond to, their national analogs; (2) are almost invariably in dynamic tension with each 
other; and (3) are necessarily circumscribed by social and political organization.  Our 
stylized model of subnational experimentation is therefore straightforward.  We hold that 
national social and economic policy regimes foster regionally distinctive winners and 
losers.  While the winners reap the rewards of the national efforts, and therefore organize 
to exploit and defend their gains in national as well as local political space, the losers pay 
the price, and therefore attempt to cushion the blow by adopting or defending contrary 
policies at the local level whenever they can.   
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We therefore treat municipal neoliberalism and municipal socialism neither as 
products nor as symptoms of their national analogs but as subnational reactions to their 
national rivals: import-substituting industrialization and free market reform respectively.  
After all, ISI privileged industrial interests in large cities and their satellites and punished 
traditional agricultural and commercial interests in the hinterland (Hirschman 1968; 
Sheahan 1987).2  Agricultural and commercial elites responded to the perceived injustice 
by demanding and exploiting compensatory arrangements including—but not limited 
to—free trade zones (Schrank 2005).  And the oldest export platforms in the region are 
therefore found not in traditional industrial centers but in their peripheries.  Table 1 lists 
Latin America’s principal FTZ host cities at the dawn of the free market era as well as the 
dates of their initial forays into export manufacturing.    
Table 1 here 
What does the table reveal?  FTZs have taken root in traditional agro-commercial 
centers and secondary cities like Cali and San Pedro Sula.  While they have occasionally 
been imitated by residents or representatives of industrial and political capitals like Santo 
Domingo and Mexico City, and were later rendered redundant by more thoroughgoing 
free market reform at the national level (Bayer 1996; Schrank 2001), they have almost 
invariably been established in the hinterland in advance of—rather than response to—the 
abandonment of ISI.3   
Municipal socialism follows the opposite pattern.  While leftist presidential 
victories in countries like Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay have been portrayed 
as products of a relatively recent and unanticipated backlash against free market reform, 
                                                 
2 Agro-commercial interests had to pay higher prices for their traditionally imported inputs and to bear the 
burden of overvalued exchange rates that constituted an indirect export tax (Hirschman 1968). 
3 Only the Salvadorans established their first FTZ near their capital.  
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and have therefore garnered a good deal of commentary, they are in many ways the 
outgrowth of years of organizing and resistance in traditional working class strongholds.  
In fact, many of the blue- and white-collar unions that gained ground in the ISI era 
refused to accept defeat at the hands of free market reform.  On the contrary, in several 
cases the groups that were bearing the burden of national neoliberalism organized to 
defend their prior gains at the local level through “socialist” experiments like 
participatory budgeting and public employment programs—and thereby lay the 
foundation of national leftist counterattacks down the road.4 Table 2 offers more or less 
parallel data on the diffusion of experiments in municipal socialism in Latin America and 
reveals a strong elective affinity with working class political influence. 
Table 2 here 
We trace variation in the success of subnational social and economic policies to 
variation in the organizational capacities of their principal supporters.  Business 
incentives like FTZs tend to foster more sustainable investment, employment, and growth 
when they are deployed and defended by well-organized indigenous elites who have a 
vested interest in regional prosperity than when they are established and exploited by 
absentee landlords or foreign investors who are less committed to the local economy 
(Schrank 2005).  And efforts to bolster local participation and the social wage tend to 
prove sustainable where the industrial working classes and their middle-class allies are 
organized and their antagonists are disorganized—and tend to fail where rival parties and 
elites are able to counterattack (Goldfrank 2007).  Therefore, Figure 1 presents a stylized 
representation of our argument—an argument we seek to illustrate with comparative 
                                                 
4 See Juan Pablo Luna (2007) for a similar argument that the recent rise of the Latin American left involves 
its ability to build a coalition of neoliberalism’s “losers.”  
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historical data drawn from Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela in the pages to follow. 
Figure 1 here 
Our cases have been purposively selected to illustrate—rather than provide a 
formal test of—the plausibility of our framework.  We make no effort to generalize our 
core claims to the rest of the region and are more interested in concept formation than in 
causal analysis in any event (Weber 1949).  Undoubtedly, careful attention to other sets 
of variables and to the complexities of more individual cases – and especially the 
different capacities of municipal governments across countries – would be necessary to 
tease out the causal relationships we propose here.  But we believe that concept formation 
is a necessary precondition of causal analysis and therefore hope that by introducing the 
concepts of municipal neoliberalism and socialism we will have paved the way for more 
systematic analyses down the road.   
Municipal Neoliberalism in Late Twentieth Century Latin America 
Municipal neoliberals insulate their private sector constituents from nationalist 
economic policies like tariffs, quotas, and foreign exchange controls by adopting or 
advocating subnational alternatives or safeguards.  While tax breaks, duty drawbacks, and 
regulatory rollbacks are common, and the list of potential safeguards is all but infinite, 
free trade zones constitute the epitome—if by no means the sole manifestation—of 
neoliberal urban governance.  After all, the zones offer their tenants duty free imports of 
capital and intermediate goods, tax breaks, and freedom from otherwise pervasive foreign 
exchange controls (World Bank 1992; Schrank 2001), and thereby facilitate the growth of 
nontraditional as well as traditional exports from otherwise inward-oriented economies. 
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Puerto Rico introduced free trade zones to Latin America in the middle of the 
twentieth century.  The so-called Economic Development Administration (Fomento) 
established by United States-appointed Governor Rexford Tugwell asked Arthur D. 
Little, Inc. (ADL), a North American consulting firm, to develop alternative employment 
outlets on the island.  ADL proposed a strategy of “industrialization by invitation” (Dietz 
1987, p. 210; see also Kahn 1986; Maldonado 1997).  Fomento would lure North 
American transplants with tax holidays, investment subsidies, and low cost labor.  North 
American investors would take advantage of Puerto Rico’s relative cost advantage.  And 
Puerto Ricans would reap the rewards of export, employment, and economic growth.   
Observers part company over the socio-economic consequences of Puerto’s 
Rico’s effort.  While mainstream economists tend to underscore the Commonwealth’s 
precipitous postwar growth rates, and therefore label “Operation Bootstraps” an 
unparalleled success (Baumol and Wolff 1996), their critics underscore the persistence of 
poverty, inequality, and emigration, and therefore provide a more nuanced assessment 
(Dietz 1987).  “The very success of the venture generated its stagnation,” argues William 
Goldsmith. “It was designed to create jobs and raise industrial wages from abysmally low 
to just very low.  In doing that, the incentive corporations previously had for relocating to 
Puerto Rico was destroyed” (Goldsmith quoted in Henderson 1990, p. 30).  By the mid-
1960s, therefore, ADL had discovered—and in many ways created—a new market for 
offshore production sites in rival locations including Mexico, Central America, the 
Dominican Republic, Colombia, Taiwan, and South Korea (Schrank 2003, p. 439).5 
                                                 
5 ADL’s rivals had entered the fray as well.  See, for example, Holmes and Narver’s plan for an FTZ in 
Saigon (Holmes and Narver 1974). 
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Municipal authorities served as ADL’s principal clients and interlocutors.  While 
export platforms like FTZs owe their legal existence to decisions made by executive 
authorities in authoritarian or oligarchic environments, and therefore constitute national 
initiatives in theory, they owe their corporeal existence to decisions made by regional and 
local elites—who not only encouraged but exploited the decrees and decisions in 
question.  Take, for example, the Border Industrialization Program that fostered the 
maquiladoras in northern Mexico.   
A substantial body of literature treats the BIP as the federal government’s 
response to the abolition of the US guest worker (i.e., bracero) program in the mid-1960s 
(Safa 1981, p. 428; Rivera-Batiz 1986, p. 263), and the threat of mass unemployment on 
the border certainly concentrated the minds of Mexican, as well as US, officials.  But the 
BIP’s origins actually predate the end of the bracero program by several years and owe 
more to the ongoing conflict between the border towns (and states) and Mexico City than 
to the sudden growth of discord between Mexico City and Washington. 
After all, the border towns and their boosters had always felt put upon by Mexico 
City (Martínez 1978; Williams 1990), and their sense of outrage and injustice had only 
intensified in the era of ISI, urban bias, and the capital’s transformation into an “urban 
leviathan” (Davis 1994).  Furthermore, the northerners had reason to be worried.  “By the 
1960s,” according to Edward Williams, “the once powerful role of the Norteños in the 
Mexico City government had diminished, suggesting that the northerners may have 
feared that their interests were in jeopardy” (Williams 1990, p. 308).   
The governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional, or PRI) responded to the threat of unrest on the border by appointing the 
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former PRI mayor of Ciudad Juárez, Antonio Bermúdez, to design a National Frontier 
Program (Programa Nacional Fronterizo) in the early 1960s.  Bermúdez hired ADL to 
formulate a regional development plan (i.e., the BIP), lobbied the central government on 
behalf of the plan’s adoption, encouraged his friends and relatives to take advantage of 
the plan, and literally “morphed his cotton fields into endless square miles of windowless, 
single-storey boxes packed with unseen workers” (Vuillamy 2003; see also Sklair 1992; 
Soden et al. 1999; Schmidt 2000; Santiago Quijada 2006).  While municipal elites in 
Mexicali, Tijuana and Matamoros reaped the rewards of the BIP as well, and therefore 
built their own industrial parks and plants in the late 1960s and 1970s, they lacked the 
“outsize influence” (Adler 2000, p. 256) of Antonio Bermúdez, and therefore continued 
to play catch-up for years to come.  By the late 1980s, therefore, Ciudad Juárez had 
assumed pride of place among Mexican export platforms, and Grupo Bermúdez alone 
had generated almost half of the city’s maquila employment (Sklair 1992, p. 99 and p. 
106 note 15; see also Palmeri 1995; Dubose and Olsson 1997).6    
In short, Mexico’s maquiladoras are products not of neoliberalism but of ISI.  The 
PRI’s populist economic policy regime privileged political and industrial interests in the 
capital at the expense of agricultural and commercial interests in secondary cities like 
Juárez.  Secondary city elites therefore organized to demand compensatory measures like 
tax breaks and duty drawbacks.  And the PRI not only embraced but enshrined their 
proposal in the form of the BIP.   
In fact, the causal arrow may run from the municipal neoliberalism to national 
neoliberalism and not vice versa (Schrank 2001), for developers and investors ‘beyond 
                                                 
6 Furthermore, Nuevo Laredo’s maquilas owe whatever success they have had to the promotional effors of 
Sergio Arguelles Gutierrez, a Matamoros agribusinessman (see Adler 2000, p. 259). 
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the border’ responded to the BIP by demanding and taking advantage of the program’s 
extension to the rest of the country in the 1970s and 1980s—and a number of observers 
have therefore attributed Mexico’s abandonment of ISI and acquiescence to free trade to 
the “demonstration effect” offered by the maquiladoras (McKean and Fox 1994, pp. 11-
12 and note 3; see also Schmidt 2000).  Insofar as they are correct, former President 
Fox’s effort to incorporate hundreds of traditionally protected manufacturing enterprises 
into the maquila regime arguably represents the culmination—and fulfillment—of the 
municipal neoliberal guerrilla campaign launched in the early 1960s (Lindquist 2006).   
Are FTZs and export platforms really agro-commercial reactions to the burdens 
imposed by ISI?  Or do they represent rational efforts to take advantage of low cost labor 
reserves on the outskirts of major North American markets?  We would obviously be 
naive to discount the importance of geography and transportation costs in their entirety.  
The maquilas have almost certainly reaped the rewards of proximity to the US market.  
But geography can explain neither the temporal nor the spatial origins of the BIP, for 
Matamoros and Tijuana are decidedly closer to North American consumers than Ciudad 
Juárez and are nonetheless responsible for neither the birth of the maquilas themselves 
nor the plurality of their employment.    
The Dominican Republic offers an even more compelling rejoinder to the 
geographical determinists, however, for the island nation’s oldest and most successful 
export platforms are found not in the coastal capital of Santo Domingo—home to the 
country’s principal containerized port—but in traditional agro-commercial centers to the 
north and southeast.  In fact, the most successful export platforms of all are found in the 
inland tobacco, coffee, and cocoa trading center of Santiago—where transport costs are 
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all but punitively high.  What accounts for the paradox?  Arthur D. Little’s consultants 
arrived in the Dominican Republic and Mexico almost simultaneously (Schrank 2003).  
While they traveled to Mexico at the behest of Antonio Bermúdez in a period of relative 
stability, and therefore had an obvious interlocutor from the get-go, they arrived in the 
DR at the behest of the United States in the aftermath of the “Dominican crisis” of 1965, 
and therefore confronted a different challenge (Schrank 2003).   
Whom would they advise?  They found their most receptive audience not in the 
political and industrial capital of Santo Domingo, where the late dictator Rafael Trujillo’s 
associates continued to dominate political and economic life, but in the traditional agro-
export centers to the north and southeast, where commercial family farmers cultivated 
coffee, tobacco, and cocoa and foreign planters cultivated sugar, respectively, for export.  
While industrial interests in the capital had a vested interest in tariffs and exchange 
controls, and therefore hoped to defend ISI from the more orthodox US advisers, their 
secondary city rivals paid a high price for economic nationalism, and therefore embraced 
at least partial liberalization (Schrank 2005). 
The North Americans and the allegedly proconsular Balaguer administration 
ultimately agreed to a compromise.  On the one hand, the North Americans would 
tolerate tariffs and import controls, and thereby save Santo Domingo’s import-competing 
manufacturers from the vagaries of international competition.  On the other hand, 
President Balaguer would tolerate free trade zones, and thereby insulate secondary city 
exporters (and the foreign transplants they hoped to court) from the burdens imposed by 
his obdurate tariff regime (Schrank 2005).   
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Secondary city elites capitalized upon the passage of the legislation almost 
immediately.  Gulf & Western, a North American conglomerate with extensive sugar 
holdings in the east, responded to the imposition of foreign exchange controls by 
establishing the country’s first FTZ with “unrepatriatable earnings” (Nelson-Horchler 
1983, p. 35) in the traditional mill town of La Romana in the late 1960s and underscored 
the model’s potential by transferring the production of nondurable consumer goods from 
subsidiaries in the US to the zone in the early 1970s.  Municipal boosters solicited a 
second zone in the nearby sugar town of San Pedro de Macorís in 1973.  And agro-
commercial elites who were outraged by the growth of ISI and urban primacy in the 
capital (Moya Pons 1992) deployed a third zone in the northern city of Santiago de los 
Caballeros a year later.   
The original zones not only prospered but inspired imitators throughout the 
country.  By the early twenty-first century, therefore, the DR played host to 
approximately 50 EPZs and their 500 tenants.  While the zones in the southeastern sugar 
belt bear the scars of a century of dependency and exploitation, and are therefore all but 
entirely dominated by foreign capital, their northern counterparts are the offspring of 
agro-commercial elites who joined forces with (and thereby learned from) foreign 
manufacturing transplants in the 1970s and 1980s, and are therefore dominated by a 
dynamic class of indigenous investors who promise to transform their regional—if not 
necessarily their national—political economy (Schrank 2005; UNDP 2005).           
Municipal neoliberalism is arguably a historical artifact, however, for FTZs and 
related incentives are apparently on the verge of extinction.  On one hand, they are 
rendered redundant by more thoroughgoing trade reforms like the ones adopted 
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throughout Latin America in the late 1980s and 1990s.  On the other hand, they are 
constrained by the World Trade Organization and related bodies—that is, by trade 
agreements that are designed by skeptics who hope to hasten their demise in favor of 
more thoroughgoing reforms in any event (Schrank 2001; Beattie and Fifield 2005).  By 
the late twentieth century, in fact, neoliberalism had assumed pride of place nationally 
and the mantle of opposition had passed from municipal neoliberalism to municipal 
socialism.  
Municipal Socialism in Contemporary Latin America 
ISI’s traditional beneficiaries responded to the advent of national-level free 
market reform by embracing municipal socialism in the late twentieth century.  
Experiments in municipal socialism find commonality in a set of policies designed to 
expand and improve municipal services, engage in redistributive spending, increase 
taxes, facilitate popular participation, and generally strengthen the role of the local state.  
Municipal socialists extend basic services like water, sewerage, roads, and mass transit to 
long-neglected urban peripheries, adopt local alternatives to healthcare, education, and 
housing programs that have been all but abandoned by national governments, and bolster 
the social wage by embracing cash grants for the elderly or families of at-risk 
schoolchildren.  Other measures including micro-credit and real estate subsidies are 
targeted at small businesses and cooperatives and channeled through innovative lending 
institutions and industry incubators. 
Municipal socialists hope to pay for their various programs by undertaking fiscal 
reforms designed to broaden the tax base, raise marginal tax rates, render tax collection 
more efficient, and reduce corruption and waste in government expenditure.  While their 
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calls for redistribution are consistent with the demands of their populist predecessors, and 
have thereby provoked hostile and often ill-informed elite reactions (Economist 1998) 
their emphasis on “good government” resonates with the ideology of municipal socialism 
prevalent in Europe and North America a century ago (Bremner 1950, pp. 478-9; see also 
Cohn 1910; Gruber 1991; Radford 2003), and is therefore surprisingly compatible with 
the contemporary dictates and preferences of the international donor community.    
Unlike the traditional populist or clientelist machines and parties that undergirded 
ISI and continued into the neoliberal era, however, and more pointedly than their 
European and North American predecessors, Latin America’s municipal socialists 
emphasize—and in many ways depend upon—popular participation in local government.  
If free trade zones are the characteristic features of municipal neoliberalism, participatory 
policies—ranging from public meetings on government spending and urban planning to 
collaborative provision of services like cooperative housing, health clinics, and pre-
schools—are the hallmarks of municipal socialism.  Not all cities listed in Table 2 make 
use of each of municipal socialism’s tools, of course, but most employ a combination of 
several elements such that a family resemblance or tendency becomes clear. 
The impetus for municipal socialism can be traced not only to the failures of ISI 
in the 1970s but to the debt crisis and structural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.  Latin 
America’s major cities grew rapidly under ISI—from roughly the late 1940s through the 
1960s—and the region’s governments offered their urban constituents a variety of 
benefits including food subsidies, low cost utilities, minimum wages, and collective 
bargaining rights.  According to Susan Eckstein, the primary beneficiaries of labor 
market regulation included skilled workers, public employees, and the middle classes, but 
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urban residents more generally gained entitlements to inexpensive housing and public 
services (Eckstein 2006, p. 10 and p. 35), though these were most often provided by 
national, not local, governments.   
Of course, rapid urbanization under ISI engendered problems for local planners, 
including depressed growth or even population decline in city centers and rapid 
expansion in remote and therefore underserved shantytowns (Portes 1989, p. 8).  But the 
problems of the ISI era paled in comparison with those of the neoliberal era inaugurated 
by the debt crisis of the early 1980s.  After all, the various measures adopted the combat 
the crisis included austerity and adjustment measures that provoked declining public 
service provision, falling incomes, rising inflation, unemployment, and the reduction or 
elimination of vital subsidies and national social welfare programs (Castells, et al 1989; 
Villa and Rodríguez 1996; Burki and Edwards 1996; Eckstein 2006, p. 27).   
Scholars have paid particularly careful attention to two responses to austerity and 
adjustment:  organized movements for urban reform and more or less spontaneous riots 
against structural adjustment (see, inter alia, Eckstein 1989; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; 
Walton 1989; López Maya 1999a).  Municipal socialism represents a third response and 
is particularly common in cities characterized by relatively high union density, large 
middle-class populations, and organized popular movements.   
What accounts for the timing and location of municipal socialism?  The urban 
working and middle-classes who were particularly hard hit by the crisis coalesced in 
support of new left parties in their traditional industrial and political strongholds—that is, 
in national capitals, industrial cities, and ports—in the late 1980s.  They were united by a 
common interest in the vitality of the public sector and the strength of democracy.  And 
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they were committed to cultivating a more open and responsive political process than had 
been available in the past as well as to defending their traditional employment guarantees, 
services, and subsidies.   
The fruits of their labors include a number of opposition parties formed by 
middle-class intellectuals and union and social movement leaders including Peru’s United 
Left, Venezuela’s Radical Cause, and Brazil’s Workers’ Party.  These parties actively 
appeal to lower- and middle-class voters as well as to their activist core constituencies in 
the labor movement.  And the participatory aspects of their experiments in municipal 
socialism are best interpreted as efforts to aggregate the diverse interests of the urban 
popular sector by creating or consolidating an identity based on active citizenship.   
Elections played virtually no role in the origins of municipal neoliberalism, which 
emerged in an era when few countries in the region were democracies.  In fact, the 
negotiations over the first wave of Mexican and Dominican FTZs occurred in proverbial 
back rooms populated by local and national elites (see, e.g., Schrank 2000; Schmidt 
2000).  By way of contrast, municipal socialists defended and exploited the franchise.  
Left parties began to experiment with municipal socialism only with the advent of 
democratization in the 1980s and gained ground in the 1990s as more countries 
introduced mayoral elections, including in capital cities, and devolved service provision 
to the municipal level partially in response to the swelling tide of social movements 
demanding popular participation and urban reform.7  In fact, the dawn of municipal 
socialism tended to follow hard on the heels of the introduction of meaningful multi-party 
mayoral elections.  As early democratizers, Peruvian and Brazilian cities were the 
                                                 
7 There is a growing literature on left parties at the local level in Latin America (see Fox 1995; Stolowicz 
1999; Baiocchi 2003; Chávez and Goldfrank 2004). 
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pioneers.  Venezuelan, Uruguayan, and Argentine municipalities followed suit. And the 
capitals of late-democratizing Mexico and El Salvador brought up the rear.   
Whether the experiments have endured and been successful or not is in part 
determined by the relative strength and cohesion of the local left’s multi-class coalition 
vis-à-vis their populist predecessors and rivals.  Where municipal socialists have been 
able to win over large segments of the poor without alienating their middle-class 
supporters, they have tended to stay in office.  Where they have failed in either (or both) 
of the two goals, however, they have been defeated by traditional populist and clientelist 
parties that continue to use patronage rather than citizen participation as their calling 
card. 
It should not be surprising that Brazilian cities have been at the forefront of 
municipal socialism.  After all, Brazil experienced more dynamic industrial growth than 
the rest of South America in the 1960s and 1970s and thereby gave birth to a strong “new 
union” movement, the Workers’ Party (PT), and an aggressive labor central (CUT).  By 
the early 1980s, the PT and the CUT had gained ground in the industrial heartland of São 
Paulo and the surrounding “ABC Paulista” metropolitan region as well as in the nearby 
port city of Santos.  White-collar workers including professionals, teachers, bank 
workers, and civil servants played a central role in both the CUT and the PT (Keck 1992, 
pp. 190-193).  Popular movements organized around collective consumption issues 
proliferated in and around São Paulo and often supported labor struggles as well (Caccia 
Bava 1994; Keck 1992).   
At the same time, however, the state of São Paulo was bearing the brunt of 
Brazil’s crisis and restructuring.  Unemployment and informalization grew rapidly, 
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especially in the industrial labor force, and the state lost nearly 150,000 formal jobs in the 
automobile industry alone between 1986 and 1996 (Klink: on-line).  Municipal socialism 
therefore emerged with force after the 1988 elections, in which voters in the major cities 
largely rejected the governing party that had overseen the crisis; the PT took São Paulo, 
Santos, and three of the largest ABC cities, as well as other large industrial and port cities 
like Porto Alegre and Vitória.   
The PT mayors were either union leaders or middle-class professionals and 
included a psychotherapist and a social worker.  They emphasized different aspects of 
municipal socialism in different Paulista cities.  For instance, the mayor of Santos won 
fame for replacing the city’s private bus company with a municipal corporation, creating 
a network of decentralized health clinics, and organizing a one-day sympathy strike in 
support of dockworkers facing layoffs from the nationally-mandated privatization of the 
port (Branford and Kucinski 1995, pp. 83-86).  The mayor of Santo André introduced 
basic income support, a municipal micro-credit program, and an urbanization program for 
shantytowns (Branford and Kucinski 2003, p. 47).  And the first PT mayor of São Paulo 
(1989-1992) built community-managed housing, improved education and healthcare 
(e.g., building five new hospitals), provided peripheral infrastructure and social services, 
and lowered the cost of public transit in part by expanding and in part by reallocating 
municipal spending (Kowarick and Singer 1994; Branford and Kucinski 1995, pp. 80-
83).8   
                                                 
8 The PT doubled municipal revenue by raising and broadening the property tax, and social spending shot 
up from 34 percent of total municipal spending under the previous mayor to almost 50 percent under the 
PT.  A subsequent PT mayor of Sao Paulo (2001-2004) offered income, training, and loans to poor families 
and the unemployed (Pochmann 2003).   
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PT mayors simultaneously attempted to implement a variety of participatory 
programs including the participatory budgeting (PB) initiatives for which their cities are 
by now justifiably famous.  PB is characterized by public debate and (to a greater or 
lesser extent) determination of municipal investment and spending priorities and is 
perhaps most often associated with Porto Alegre, arguably the most successful case of 
municipal socialism in Brazil.   
The PT governed Porto Alegre for four consecutive mayoral terms (1989-2004).  
The city’s industrial history is by now familiar and provides the essential context for 
municipal socialism:  rapid growth during the “miracle” years followed by stagnation, 
unemployment, informalization, and declining living conditions in the 1980s.  Like São 
Paulo, Porto Alegre played host to a strike wave in the 1970s and contributed founding 
members to the PT including Olívio Dutra, a leader of the local bank workers’ union and 
the city’s first PT mayor.  As Baierle (2005, p. 23) argues:  “The PT came from the social 
movements, but its strength in Porto Alegre lay, above all, in the middle sectors 
(architects, journalists, bank workers, teachers, telephone workers, etc.).”  While the 
party’s leaders included residents and representatives of poor neighborhoods, including 
social workers and members of Catholic base communities, their impoverished neighbors 
had already been incorporated into a populist organization with deep local roots—the 
Democratic Labor Party (PDT), and the PT therefore ensured the success of municipal 
socialism by courting the PDT’s lower-class constituency without scaring off the middle-
class. 
Under the PT, Porto Alegre embraced and exemplified the entire municipal 
socialist agenda.  The city government adopted participatory budgeting and responded to 
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popular preferences by extending and improving public service provision.  Between the 
late 1980s and the late 1990s the PT almost doubled the size of the sewage network—
from 477 miles to 850 miles—and connected 135,000 domiciles, paved 186 miles of 
roads, extended piped water and garbage collection services throughout the city, and 
increased the number of routes and riders served by the municipal bus company 
(Goldfrank 2002b: 292-296).  Social services were expanded as well: thousands of 
families received public housing or land titles; the number of municipally-run schools 
more than tripled; a network of more than one hundred municipally-funded and 
cooperatively-run daycares was established; and the municipality built twenty new 
neighborhood health clinics and assumed control of the local healthcare system from the 
state government (Goldfrank 2002b: 294-295).  The city government opened a micro-
credit bank, built an incubator for small industrial ventures, and started a recycling 
cooperative.  And the PT paid for it all with progressive taxation and a crackdown on 
evasion (Goldfrank 2002b, pp. 227-228).  Finally, the city’s achievements—and 
particularly its participatory budgeting process—attracted admirers and imitators in 
scores of cities throughout Brazil and beyond (Goldfrank 2006). 
The expansion of infrastructure and services in Porto Alegre had a strongly 
redistributive cast, for the participatory budgeting criteria allocated spending to areas 
with the greatest needs.  Many of the city’s poorest neighborhoods were visibly 
transformed.  And ecological analyses of voting patterns reveal that over the years the PT 
has assumed the PDT’s traditional position as the most popular party in lower-class 
neighborhoods.  The PT also maintained a plurality in the middle-class neighborhoods 
where it originally performed best until 2004, when the historically weak opposition at 
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last accepted many of the PT’s programs and the PT mayoral candidate saw his share of 
the vote in middle- and upper-class neighborhoods plummet by 10 to 12 percentage 
points (Baierle 2005, p. 41). Middle-class voters essentially defected from the multi-class 
coalition undergirding municipal socialism and cost the PT the race.  While the new 
mayor has retained a number of trademark PT policies, including participatory budgeting, 
he has also promised a more business-friendly administration.  And the PT has offset its 
losses in Porto Alegre by winning 411 cities in the 2004 elections and thereby gaining 
hundreds of new laboratories in which to experiment.   
A history of decentralized federalism renders Brazil a particularly likely breeding 
ground for municipal socialist experiments.  But similar experiments have emerged in 
less likely contexts and provide support for our belief that the timing and character of 
municipal socialism are shaped by legacy of ISI and the organizational capacity of the 
working- and middle-class alliance. 
Uruguay boasts perhaps the most successful case of municipal socialism outside 
of Brazil.  The Broad Front (FA) has governed the capital of Montevideo since Tabaré 
Vázquez, who is currently the country’s president, won the 1989 mayoral election as 
voters rejected national-level neoliberal reforms.  The FA unites several political parties 
that have strong union and social movement bases including the Communists and the 
Socialists and in many respects resembles the PT.  And FA administrations have 
transformed Montevideo in ways similar to those described above for Porto Alegre with 
similar tools (Goldfrank 2002a).   
Furthermore, the FA and the PT share common organizational histories.  Like the 
PT, the FA started out stronger in middle-class neighborhoods than in poorer areas (with 
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the exception of one union stronghold) and gained ground among the poor after winning 
elected office and redistributing income through infrastructural development and the 
provision of social services (Luna 2004, p. 19).9  While Uruguay’s traditional parties, the 
Colorados and Blancos, successfully blocked the FA’s most far-reaching participatory 
programs and tax reforms, they failed to provide a strong alternative to municipal 
socialism and therefore lost ground to the FA over time.  As Luna (2004, p. 21) notes, 
“the clientelistic apparatuses of both traditional parties atrophied as a result of the 
economic crisis.” 
Venezuelan cities provide parallels as well as contrasts.  Like Brazil and Uruguay, 
Venezuela gave birth to a left leaning party with strong ties to dissident labor unions in 
the late twentieth century (Hellinger 1996).  While representatives of the Radical Cause 
(CR), as the party is known, assumed control of traditional industrial centers in the early 
1990s, and tried to implement municipal socialism in Ciudad Guayana and Caracas, they 
were decidedly more successful in the former than the latter.  After all, Ciudad Guayana 
had been established in 1961 as part of the national state’s effort to expand 
industrialization and therefore featured stronger industrial unions and weaker traditional 
party organizations than the capital.  The CR, and later a splinter party committed to 
municipal socialism, governed Ciudad Guayana for over a decade (four consecutive 
terms) and implemented a number of distributive policies including participatory 
budgeting and investment in working class neighborhoods (López Maya 1999b).  By way 
of contrast, the CR achieved little in Caracas and failed to gain re-election (Goldfrank 
2002b).   
                                                 
9 See Goldfrank (2002b, pp. 202-205) for quantitative analyses of the relationship between poverty and 
spending in Montevideo. 
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What accounts for the CR’s failure in the capital in the mid-1990s?  While party 
activists embraced municipal socialism in theory, and therefore adopted participatory 
budgeting measures, they treated the middle classes as their core constituents in practice, 
and therefore distributed their per capita investments in a “need blind” manner 
(Goldfrank 2002b, p. 135-137).  As a result, the CR failed to attract lower class support 
and opened the door to a counterattack from traditional parties like Acción Democrática 
(AD) that had always been stronger in Caracas than Ciudad Guayana in any event.   
Conclusion 
Max Weber believed that the social sciences advanced through the construction, 
critique, and reformulation of the “concepts through which we seek to comprehend 
reality” (Weber 1949, pp. 105-6).  We have deployed the concepts of municipal 
neoliberalism and municipal socialism in an effort to comprehend Latin American reality 
and we therefore believe that our paper’s principal contributions are conceptual—that is, 
that one can find value in the concepts of municipal neoliberalism and municipal 
socialism without embracing our account of their origins and consequences. 
We have nonetheless advanced a preliminary account of the origins of urban 
policy regimes in late twentieth century Latin America as well.  Our account is bivariate.  
The first variable—the municipality’s traditional orientation to the world economy—
dictates policy preferences.  While traditionally outward-oriented cities paid a 
particularly high price for economic nationalism, and therefore responded to ISI by 
deploying FTZs in the 1960s and 1970s, their traditionally inward-oriented rivals bore the 
brunt of austerity and structural adjustment, and therefore adopted distributive 
countermeasures in the subsequent era of national neoliberal reform.  The second 
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variable—the organizational capacities of municipal classes and sectors—determines the 
degree to which urban elites and activists are able to translate their preferences into 
reality.  While domestically controlled export sectors are likely to be particularly well-
organized, and therefore tend to engender more successful neoliberal experiments than 
their foreign-controlled counterparts, insurgent parties in cities with broadly based class 
structures are likely to be particularly encompassing, and therefore tend to engender more 
sustainable socialist experiments than their more narrowly based counterparts—
especially when they emerge in weak party systems (e.g., Brazil).   
One need not understand the origins of municipal policy regimes to recognize 
their salience, however, and an astute observer will draw at least three conclusions from 
the neoliberal and socialist experiments we have identified whether or not he or she 
agrees with our interpretation of their origins and degree of success.  First, national 
economic policy regimes do not penetrate their national territories in a homogeneous 
fashion; on the contrary, they tend to accommodate, reproduce, and in some cases 
magnify subnational variation.  Second, subnational political and economic experiments 
are as likely to produce as to be products of the national policies they resemble, for 
dissident municipalities that pay the price for policy reforms offer their residents space in 
which to defend their historical gains and launch nationwide counterattacks.  And, third, 
the “subnational comparative method” is therefore an essential counterweight to “whole 
nation bias” as well as a useful source of additional degrees of freedom (Snyder 2001; 
Gibson 2005).     
What, then, does the future hold for Latin American cities?  We can envision two 
distinct possibilities.  On the one hand, local authorities in traditional export centers like 
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Maracaibo, Venezuela (Gonzalez 2003), Guayaquil, Ecuador (de la Torre 2008), and 
Santa Cruz, Bolivia (Eaton 2007) are responding to the resurgence of the left at the 
national level with renewed calls for autonomy at the local level in order to protect 
against advancing statist agendas.  So far their campaigns have been limited in both scope 
and influence, except in Bolivia, where other provinces have joined Santa Cruz in 
holding autonomy referenda.  If these efforts gain traction, they could well constitute the 
shock troops of a renewed cycle of municipal neoliberalism—with attendant 
consequences for national politics down the road.   
On the other hand, municipal authorities elsewhere in Latin America are 
converging upon a common set of tools derived from both the neoliberal and socialist 
toolkits.  After all, the archetypal institutions of both urban policy regimes—FTZs and 
participatory budgeting—have proliferated throughout the region, yielding interesting, 
but very new, hybrids that would be fascinating cases for further research.  For example, 
cities with earlier experiments in municipal socialism like Ciudad Guayana and Estelí, 
Nicaragua have recently opened tax-free industrial zones.  Porto Alegre’s new post-PT 
mayor offers large corporations generous tax breaks (Chavez 2006).  And literally 
hundreds of Latin American cities have adopted participatory budgeting initiatives 
(Goldfrank 2006). Maquila owners were among the primary champions of PB in Santiago 
de los Caballeros in the Dominican Republic, which went on to pass a law in 2007 
requiring PB in all Dominican municipalities.  In El Salvador, municipal governments 
from across the political spectrum play host to both FTZs and participatory budgeting. 
The apparent convergence of local neoliberal and socialist experiments may 
derive from the shortcomings of each strategy when pursued in isolation. While 
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neoliberalism undercuts the social safety net and contributes to the atomization or—
worse, from the employer’s perspective—mobilization of the citizenry, socialism 
undercuts investment and renders the creation of income-generating activity less likely. 
The current convergence may therefore represent a Polanyian “double movement” 
(Polanyi 1944).  Efforts to marketize Latin America at all costs have been reined in by 
efforts to provide at least minimal social safety nets—but the knitters of those nets seem 
to recognize that the market is better cushioned than repressed.10  While these 
experiments are still in process, and face myriad opponents and obstacles, they have a 
good deal of potential, and advocates of sustainable alternatives to both neoliberalism and 
populism at the national level would therefore do well to look toward the local level for 
their models.  It is in the cities, and not the legislatures and national palaces, that we will 
find the most numerous, diverse, and interesting experiments. 
                                                 
10 In addition to municipal policymakers, international policymakers in institutions like the World Bank 
seem to appreciate the need for policies for both development and distribution, as the Bank and other 
development institutions have begun to push both FTZs and PB, which helps explain their ubiquity. 
 30 
Bibliography 
Adler, Bill.  2000.  Mollie’s Job: A Story of Life and Work on the Global Assembly Line.  
New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Antiago Quijada, Guadalupe.  2006.  “Antecedentes de la industria maquiladora.”  
CITTAC.  April 9. 
Baierle, Sérgio.  2005.  “Lutas em Porto Alegre:  entre a revolução política e o 
transformismo.”  MAPAS Project Report.  December. 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo, ed. 2003.  Radicals in Power:  The Workers’ Party and 
Experiments with Urban Democracy in Brazil (London and New York:  Zed 
Books). 
Baumol, William, and Edward Wolff.  1996.  “Catching Up in the Postwar Period: Puerto 
Rico as the Fifth ‘Tiger.’”  World Development.  24 (5): 869-85. 
Bayer, Alex.  1996.  “The dark side of ex-im centers.”  Treasury & Risk Management.  
September. 
Beattie, Alan, and Anna Fifield.  2005.  “Zone alone.”  Financial Times.  May 12. 
Branford, Sue, and Bernardo Kucinski.  2003.  Politics Transformed:  Lula and the 
Workers’ Party in Brazil (London:  Latin American Bureau). 
Branford, Sue, and Bernardo Kucinski. 1995.  Brazil: Carnival of the Oppressed 
(London:  Latin American Bureau). 
Braütigam, Deborah.  2004.  “The People’s Budget? Politics, Participation, and Pro-Poor 
Policy.”  Development Policy Review.  22 (6): 653-68. 
 31 
Bremner, Robert.  1950.  “The Civic Revival in Ohio: Municipal Ownership and 
Economic Privilege.”  American Journal of Economics and Sociology.  9 (4): 477-
82. 
Bridges, Tyler.  1987.  “Chile trade zone turns small town into booming city.”  Christian 
Science Monitor.  November 24. 
Business Week. 1979.  “What lures industry to Brazil's Northeast?”  April 16. 
Caccia Bava, Sílvio. 1994.  “Neighborhood Movements and the Trade Unions:  The São 
Bernardo Experience,” in Lúcio Kowarick, ed., Social Struggles and the City: The 
Case of São Paulo (New York:  Monthly Review Press). 
Catanese, Anthony.  1973.  “Planning in a State of Siege: The Colombia Experience.”  
Land Economics.  49 (1): 35-43. 
Chavez, Daniel.  2006.  “Participation Lite: The Watering Down of People Power in 
Porto Alegre,” Red Pepper (May). 
Chavez, Daniel, and Benjamin Goldfrank, eds.  2004.  The Left in the City:  Participatory 
Local Governments in Latin America (London:  Latin American Bureau and 
Transnational Institute). 
Christopherson, Susan.  1994.  “The fortress city. Privatized spaces, consumer 
citizenship.”  Pp. 409-27 in A. Amin, ed., Post-Fordism. A Reader.  Oxford: 
Blackwell 
Cohn, Gustav.  1910.  “Municipal Socialism.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 20, No. 80. 
(Dec., 1910), pp. 561-568. 
Coone, Tim.  1987.  “Honda Close To Deal On Argentine Plant.”  Financial Times.  June 
10. 
 32 
Davis, Diane.  1994.  Urban Leviathan: Mexico City in the Twentieth Century.  
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
De la Torre, Patricia.  2008.  “La autonomía guayaquileña.”  El Telégrafo.  June 12, 
2008. 
Dietz, James.  1987.  Economic History of Puerto Rico: Institutional Change and 
Capitalist Development.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Dubose, Louis, and Karen Olsson.  1997.  “Border Games.”  Civilization.  4 (4): 38-46. 
Eaton, Kent.  2007  “Backlash in Bolivia: Regional Autonomy as a Reaction against 
Indigenous Mobilization.”  Politics & Society.  35: 71-102. 
Eckstein, Susan, ed. 1989. Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social 
Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press). 
Eckstein, Susan. 2006. “Urban Resistance to Neoliberal Democracy Across Latin 
America.” Prepared for delivery at the 2006 Meeting of the Latin American 
Studies Association. San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 15-18. 
Economist.  1987.  “But Quito isn't Guayaquil, alas.”  December 26. 
Economist.  1998.  “New ideas for the old left.”  January 17. 
Economist.  1999.  “Under the volcano.”  November 27. 
Economist.  2001.  “A Country Apart.”  April 21. 
Enyeart, John. 2003. "Revolution or Evolution: The Socialist Party, Western Workers, 
and Law in the Progressive Era," Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. 
October. 
 33 
Escobar, Arturo, and Sonia Alvarez, eds.  1992.  The Making of Social Movements in 
Latin America:  Identity, Strategy, and Democracy (Boulder, San Francisco, and 
Oxford:  Westview Press). 
Evans, Peter.  2002.  Livable Cities? Urban Struggles for Livelihood and Sustainability.  
Berkeley: University of California Press).  
Fainstein, Susan.  1992.  Divided Cities: New York and London in the Contemporary 
World.  Oxford: Blackwell. 
Florida, Richard.  2002.  The rise of the creative class.  New York: Basic Books. 
Forero, Juan.  2004.  “In Bolivia's Elitist Corner, There's Talk of Cutting Loose.”  New 
York Times.  August 24. 
Fox, Jonathan.  1995.  “The Crucible of Local Politics,” NACLA: Report on the 
Americas.  29:1 (July-August). 
Gibson, Edward.  2005.  “Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in 
Democratic Countries.”  World Politics.  58: 101-32.   
Goldfrank, Benjamin.  2002a. “The Fragile Flower of Local Democracy:  A Case Study 
of Decentralization/Participation  in Montevideo,” Politics & Society, 30:1 
(March): 51-83. 
Goldfrank, Benjamin.  2002b.  Urban Experiments in Citizen Participation, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. 
Goldfrank, Benjamin. 2004.  “Conclusion: The End of Politics or a New Beginning for 
the Left?” In Chavez and Goldfrank, eds., The Left in the City (London:  Latin 
American Bureau and Transnational Institute). 
 34 
Goldfrank, Benjamin.  2006.  “Los procesos de ‘presupuesto participativo’ en América 
Latina: Éxito, fracaso y cambio,” Revista de Ciencia Política, 26:2, Chile 
(December): 3-28. 
Goldfrank, Benjamin.  2007.  “The Politics of Deepening Local Democracy: 
Decentralization, Party Institutionalization, and Participation.”  Comparative 
Politics, 39 (January): 147-68.   
Gonzalez, David.  2003.  “Maracaibo Oil Region a Crucial Battleground for Chavez as 
Venezuelan Conflict Rages .”  New York Times.  February 28. 
Gruber, Helmut.  1991.  Red Vienna: Experiment in Working-Class Culture, 1919-1934.  
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hall, Tim, and Phil Hubbard.  1996.  “The entrepreneurial city: new politics, new urban 
geographies.”  Progress in Human Geography.  20: 153-174 
Harris, Nigel.  1997.  “Cities in a global economy: Structural change and policy 
reactions.”  Urban Studies.  34 (1): 1693-1703. 
Heller, Patrick.  1995.  “From Redistribution to Class Compromise: Redistribution and 
Growth in a South Indian State.”  Journal of Development Studies.  31 (5): 645-
72. 
Hellinger, Daniel. 1996.  “The Causa R and the Nuevo Sindicalismo in Venezuela,” Latin 
American Perspectives, Issue 90, 23:3 (Summer): 110-131. 
Henderson, Zorika.  1990.  “Enterprise Zones Are Pie-in-the-Sky Solutions to Poverty.”  
Human Ecology.  18 (3): 30-31. 
Hirschman, Albert.  1968.  “Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in 
Latin America.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
 35 
Holmes and Narver.  1974.  Saigon export processing zone planning study .  Saigon: 
USAID Mission to Vietnam.  
Jeroen Klink.  Online.  “Re-inventing Regional Planning in a Context of Local Economic 
Restructuring: The Case of the Greater ABC Region, Sao Paulo, Brazil,” City 
Matters. <http://www.urbanicity.org/FullDoc.asp?ID=317> Accessed August 23, 
2006. 
Judd, Richard William.  1989.  Socialist Cities:  Municipal Politics and the Grass Roots 
of American Socialism.  Albany: State University of New York. 
Kahn, E.J.  1986.  The Problem Solvers: A History of Arthur D. Little.  Boston: Little 
Brown. 
Keck, Margaret.  1992.  The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil (New Haven 
and London:  Yale University Press). 
King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba.  1994.  Designing Social Inquiry: 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.  Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Kowarick, Lúcio, and André Singer.  1994.  "The Workers’ Party in São Paulo," in Lúcio 
Kowarick, ed., Social Struggles and the City: The Case of São Paulo (New York:  
Monthly Review Press). 
Lee, Cristina.  1989.  “Big Argentine province pursues US trade ties.”  Journal of 
Commerce.  March 3. 
Lindquist, Diane.  2006.  “Fox decree may revitalize maquiladora industry .”  San Diego 
Union Tribune.  August 16.   
 36 
López Maya, Margarita, ed.  1999a. Lucha popular, democracia, neoliberalismo: 
protesta popular en América Latina en los años de ajuste (Caracas:  Editorial 
Nueva Sociedad). 
López Maya, Margarita. 1999b. “Alcaldías de Izquierda en Venezuela:  Gestiones 
Locales de La Causa Radical (1989-1996),” in Beatriz Stolowicz, ed., Gobiernos 
de izquierda en América Latina: El Desafío del Cambio (México, DF:  Plaza y 
Valdés Editores). 
Low, Setha.  1997.  “Urban Fear: Building the Fortress City.”  City and Society.  9 (1): 
53-71. 
Luna, Juan Pablo.  2007.  “Frente Amplio and the Crafting of a Social Democratic 
Alternative in Uruguay.”  Latin American Politics & Society. 49 (4): 1-30. 
Luna, Juan Pablo. 2004. “Between the sword and the wall? The recent transformation of 
Frente Amplio’s social base and some implications for the Latin American left.” 
Paper presented at the Working Group on Political and Economic Regimes in 
Latin America at UNC Chapel Hill. November. 
MacLeod, Gordon.  2002. “From Urban Entrepreneurialism to a ‘Revanchist City’? On 
the Spatial Injustices of Glasgow’s Renaissance.”  Antipode.  34 (3): 602-24.   
Magee, John.  1985.  Arthur D. Little, Inc.: At the Moving Frontier.  New York: 
Newcomen Society. 
Maldonado, A.W.  1997.  Teodoro Moscoso and Puerto Rico’s Operation Bootstrap.  
Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 
Markey, Patrick.  2005.  “In Bolivia, Rich West Demands Autonomy.”  Washington Post.  
February 6. 
 37 
Martínez, Oscar.  1978.  Border Boom Town: Ciudad Juárez since 1848.  Austin: 
University of Texas Press. 
Mayer, Margit.  “Post-Fordist City Politics.”  Pp. 316-37 in A. Amin, ed., Post-Fordism. 
A Reader.  Oxford: Blackwell  
McKean, Cressida, and James Fox.  1994.  Export and Investment Promotion Services: 
Do They Work?  Washington: USAID.   
Menocal, Alina Rocha.  2004.  “A new wave of decentralization in Latin America? A 
conversation with Rosemary Thorp.”  Development in Practice.  14 (6): 724-32. 
Montero, Alfred.  2001.  “Making and Remaking ‘Good Government’ in Brazil: 
Subnational Industrial Policy in Minas Gerais.”  Latin American Politics and 
Society.  43 (2):  
Moya Pons, Frank.  1992.  Empresarios en conflicto: Políticas de industrialización y 
sustitución de importaciones en la República Dominicana.  Santo Domingo: 
Fondo para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales, Inc. 
Nelson-Horchler, Joani.  1983.  “US Multinationals: Benefactors or Bandits?” Industry 
Week.  April 18.  p. 35.   
Ocampo, José Antonio, and Juan Martín.  2003.  A Decade of Light and Shadow. Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the 1990s.  Santiago: CEPAL.  
Palmeri, Christopher.  1995.  “The Flip Side of Devaluation.”  Forbes.  155 (4): 44-5. 
Pinnock, Don.  1989.  “Ideology and urban planning: blueprints for a garrison city.”  Pp.  
150-68 in W. James. and M. Simons, eds., The Angry Divide.  Cape Town: David 
Philips. 
 38 
Piore, Michael.  2005.  “Normas laborales de Mexico en la economía global.”  Comercio 
Exterior.  55 (2): 140-7.  
Pochmann, Marcio, ed. 2003.  Outra Cidade é Possível:  Alternatias de Inclusão Social 
em São Paulo (São Paulo:  Cortez Editora). 
Polanyi, Karl.  1944.  The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press). 
Portes, Alejandro. 1989. “Latin American Urbanization in the Years of the Crisis,” Latin 
American Research Review, 24:3. 
Quilley, Stephen. 2000.  “Manchester First: From Municipal Socialism to the 
Entrepreneurial City,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
Vol 24, No. 3.  601 – 615. 
Radford, Gail. 2003. “From Municipal Socialism to Public Authorities: Institutional 
Factors in the Shaping of American Public Enterprise,” Journal of American 
History Vol. 90, No. 3, December. 
Rivera-Batiz, Francisco.  1986.  “Can Border Industries Be a Substitute for 
Immigration?”  American Economic Review.  76 (2): 263-8. 
Roberts, Bryan, and Alejandro Portes. 2005.  “Coping with the Free Market City: 
Collective Action in Six Latin American Cities at the End of the Twentieth 
Century.” Latin American Research Review. 41 (2): 57-83. 
Safa, Helen.  1981.  “Runaway Shops and Female Employment: The Search for Cheap 
Labor.”  Signs.  7 (2): 418-33. 
Sassen, Saskia.  1991.  The Global City: New York, London and Tokyo. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 39 
Schmidt, Samuel.  2000.  In Search of Decision: The Maquiladora Industry in Mexico.  
Juárez, Chihuahua: UACJ/Flagstaff Institute. 
Schrank, Andrew.  2000.  Urban Bias, Hinterland Response: Social Organization and 
Export Diversification in the Dominican Republic.  Unpublished PhD dissertation.  
Department of Sociology.  University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
Schrank, Andrew.  2001.  “Export Processing Zones: Free Market Islands or Bridges to 
Structural Transformation?” Development Policy Review.  19 (2): 223-42. 
Schrank, Andrew.  2003.  “Foreign investors, ‘flying geese,’ and the limits to export-led 
industrialization in the Dominican Republic.”  Theory and Society.  32: 415-43. 
Schrank, Andrew.  2005. “Entrepreneurship, Export Diversification, and Economic 
Reform: The Birth of a ‘Developmental Community’ in the Dominican 
Republic.”  Comparative Politics. 38 (October): 43-62. 
Schumacher, Edward.  1983.  “City in Argentina lives up to its rebellious image.”  New 
York Times.  November 12. 
Scott, Allen.  “Creative Cities: Conceptual Issues and Policy Questions.”  Journal of 
Urban Affairs.  28 (1): 1-17. 
Sheahan, John.  1987.  Patterns of Development in Latin America: Poverty, Repression, 
and Economic Strategy.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
Siri, Gabriel.  2000.  “Employment and Social Investment Funds in Latin America.”  
SETP No. 7.  Geneva: ILO. 
Sklair, Leslie.  1992.  “The Maquilas in Mexico: A Global Perspective.”  Bulletin of Latin 
American Research.  11 (1): 91-107. 
 40 
Snyder, Richard.  2001.  “Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method.”  
Studies in Comparative International Development.  36 (1): 93-110. 
Soden, Dennis, et al.  1999.  “The Delphi Decision: A Case Study.”  IPED Technical 
Report 99-5.  Public Policy Research Center.  El Paso: UTEP.   
Soja, Edward.  1995.  “Postmodern Urbanization: The Six Restructurings of Los 
Angeles.”  Pp. 125-37 in S. Watson and K. Gibson, eds., Postmodern Cities and 
Spaces.  Oxford: Blackwell. 
Stansbury, Burke.  2006.  “El Salvador: Elections and the FMLN.”  NACLA Report on 
the Americas.  39 (6): 45-6. 
Stolowicz, Beatriz, ed. 1999. Gobiernos de izquierda en América Latina: El Desafío del 
Cambio (México, DF:  Plaza y Valdés Editores). 
Tendler, Judith, and Rodrigo Serrano.  1999.  “The Rise of Social Funds: What are they a 
model of?”  MIT/UNDP Decentralization Project.  1999. 
Tendler, Judith.  2000.  “Why are social funds so popular?”  Pp. 114-29 in Yusuf and 
Evenett, eds., Local Dynamics in an Era of Globalization: 21st Century Catalysts 
for Development.  Washington: World Bank. 
Tendler, Judith.  2002.  “Small Firms, the Informal Sector, and the Devil's Deal.”  IDS  
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).  2005.  República Dominicana: 
Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2005: Hacia una inserción mundial 
incluyente y renovada.  Santo Domingo: PNUD. 
Villa, Miguel, and Jorge Rodríguez. 1996.  “Demographic trends in Latin America's 
metropolises, 1950-1990.” In Alan Gilbert, ed., The mega-city in Latin America 
 41 
(Tokyo, New York, and Paris: United Nations University Press). On-line: 
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu23me/uu23me00.htm#Contents 
Vuillamy, Edward.  2002.  “Dispatches: The Lawless Mexican Border Town of Juarez Is 
No Stranger to Death.”  Observer Magazine (Guardian Newspaper).  March 9. 
Walton, John. 1989. “Debt, Protest, and the State in Latin America,” in Susan Eckstein, 
ed., Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements (Berkeley: 
University of California Press). 
Wampler, Brian, and Leonardo Avritzer. 2004. “Participatory Publics:  Civil Society and 
New Institutions in Democratic Brazil,” Comparative Politics, 36 (April): 291-
312. 
Weber, Max.  1949.  The Methodology of the Social Sciences.  New York: Free Press.   
Weitzman, Hal.  2006.  “Cheers and faint war drums as Santa Cruz dreams of autonomy.”  
Financial Times.  July 1. 
Wheatley, Jonathan.  1997.  “‘Tiger’ economies of NE Brazil”  Financial Times.  
December 11.  
Williams, Edward.  1990.  “The Resurgent North and Contemporary Mexican 
Regionalism.”  Mexican Studies.  6 (2): 299-323. 
World Bank.  1992.  Export Processing Zones.  Washington: World Bank. 
 42 
Table 1: FTZ host cities by country, circa 1990. 
Country Location Year first zone established 
Brazil Manaus 1967 
   
Chile Iquique 1975 
   
Colombia Baranquilla 1964 
 Cucutá 1972 
 Buenaventura 1973 
 Cali  1974 
 Santa Marta  1974 
 Cartagena 1978 
   
Costa Rica Puerto Moin 1977 
 El Roble (near Puntarenas) 1980-1985 
 Cartago 1985 
 Alajuela 1988 
 San José  1989 
   
Dominican Republic La Romana 1968 
 San Pedro de Macorís 1973 
 Santiago 1974 
 Puerto Plata  1983 
 Baní 1986 
 San Cristóbal 1986 
 Santo Domingo  1986 
 La Vega 1987 
 Bonao 1988 
 Esperanza 1988 
 Moca 1988 
 Villa Altagracia 1988 
 Barahona 1989 
 San Francisco de Macorís 1989 
   
El Salvador San Bartolo (near San Salvador) 1973 
   
Guatemala Santo Tómas de Castilla 1972 
 La Unión 1989 
   
Honduras Puerto Cortes 1972 
 San Pedro Sula 1980s 
   
Mexico Northern border (20 km. limit) 1965 
 Expansion to remainder of country 1972 
   
Sources: Bridges (1987); World Bank 1992 (Table A3); Bayer (1996); and Schrank (2001).  The unit of analysis is the city; some 
cities feature multiple zones.   Mexico gave individual factories as well as industrial parks “maquiladora” (or FTZ) status; however, 






Table 2:  Selected Cases of Municipal Socialism in Latin America 
Municipality Party Years in Office 
Location Party or coalition Time frame 
Ciudad Guayana (Mun. 
Caroní), Venezuela 
Causa Radical; Patria Para Todos 1989 – 1997; 1998 – 2001, 2004 – 
Present 
Caracas (Mun. Libertador), 
Venezuela 
Causa Radical; Partido Socialista 
Unido de Venezuela 
1993 – 1995; 2000-Present 
Lima, Peru Izquierda Unida 1984 – 1986 
Ilo, Peru Izquierda Unida; Fuerza Ilo 1981 – 1989; 1990 – 2001 
Rosario, Argentina Partido Socialista (Popular) 1989 – Present 
Montevideo, Uruguay Frente Amplio 1990 – Present  
Mexico City, Mexico Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática 
1997 – Present 
Bogotá, Colombia Polo Democrático Independiente 2003 – Present 
San Salvador, El Salvador Frente Farabundo Martí para la 
Liberación Nacional 
1998 – Present 
Estelí, Nicaragua Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional 
1979 – Present 
Porto Alegre (RS), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores 1989 – 2004 
São Paulo (SP), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores 1989 – 1992; 2001 – 2004 
Belo Horizonte (MG), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores; Partido 
Socialista Brasileira; PT 
1993 – 1996; 1996 – 2002; 2002 – 
Present 
Brasília (DF), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores 1995 – 1998 
São Bernardo (SP), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores 1989 – 1992  
Mauá (SP), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores 1997 –  2004 
Santos (SP), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores 1989 – 1996 
Diadema (SP), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores; Partido 
Socialista Brasileiro; PT 
1983 – Present 
Santo André (SP), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores 1989 – 1992, 1996 – Present 
Vitória (ES), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores 1989 – 1992; 2005 – Present  
Belém (PA), Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores 1996 – 2004 
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